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Roseman on the ground of forum non conveniens illustrates the way
in which administrative benefits may be derived from use of the
doctrine while preserving the "interests of justice."
Joseph G. Braunreuther
ARTICLE 14-CONTRIBUTION
Dole claim held to accrue on date judgment is paid by party seeking
contribution
Article 14 of the CPLR, the codification of the seminal Dole v.
Dow Chemical Co. 8 decision, authorizes a claim for contribution
among joint tortfeasors in proportion to their relative culpability."
Although the legislation describes the procedure for claiming contri-
bution," it does not expressly define when the cause of action ac-
crues." One line of cases in New York has held that the Dole cause
of action ripens on the date the claimant actually pays the judg-
ment for which contribution is sought. 1 A second view has main-
30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 148, 185 (1972).
93 CPLR 1401-1402. The Dole Court stated:
[WI]here a third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not all, of
the negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for that
part is recoverable by the prime defendant against the third party. To reach that
end there must necessarily be an apportionment of responsibility between those
parties.
30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
This reasoning has been codified in CPLR 1401, which states, in pertinent part, that "two
or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury. . . or
wrongful death, may claim contribution among them .... " and in CPLR 1402, which
provides that a tortfeasor is entitled to contribution for the amount paid in excess of his
"equitable share . . . determined in accordance with the relative culpability of each person
liable for contribution."
CPLR 1403 provides that "[a] cause of action for contribution may be asserted in a
separate action or by cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim in a pending action."
0 The accrual issue has particular significance when the claimant is seeking contribution
from the state. In such cases, the claimant cannot bring the state into the primary action,
since the state can only be sued in the Court of Claims. Breen v. Mortgage Comm'n, 285 N.Y.
425, 429, 35 N.E.2d 25, 26 (1941); see In re Dormitory Auth., 18 N.Y.2d 114, 218 N.E.2d 693,
271 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1966). Instead, the claimant must bring a separate action for contribution
in the Court of Claims after complying with the jurisdictional filing and notice requirements
of the Court of Claims Act. N.Y. CT. CL. ACr § 8 (McKinney 1963); see McCorkle v. Degl,
74 Misc. 2d 611, 344 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1973); 2A WK&M 1403.05. Since
the limitations period for filing an action in the Court of Claims is unusually abbreviated,
see note 101 infra, the question when the cause of action accrues becomes extremely impor-
tant.
11 See, e.g., Blum v. Good Humor Corp., 57 App. Div. 2d 911, 394 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d Dep't
1977); Bay Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State, 57 App. Div. 2d 237, 394 N.Y.S.2d 464 (3d Dep't
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tained that the claim accrues upon entry of judgment,92 while a
third line of decisions has suggested that the claim arises on the
date of the underlying tortious act . 3 Recently, in Bay Ridge Air
Rights, Inc. v. State,4 the Court of Appeals resolved this conflict,
1977), affl'd, 44 N.Y.2d 49, 375 N.E.2d 29, 404 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1978); Berlin & Jones, Inc. v.
State, 85 Misc. 2d 970, 381 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Adams v. Lindsay, 77 Misc. 2d 824,
354 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1974), discussed in The Survey, 49 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 170, 207 (1974). Many commentators have also endorsed the use of the date-of-payment
rule. See, e.g., CPLR 1402, commentary at 17 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); CPLR 3019,
commentary at 21 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); 2A WK&M 1401.19, 1403.03. But see
Ocbhialino, Contribution, NINETEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CoNrENacR 217 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Contribution].
The date-of-payment rule is derived from the accrual rule traditionally applied to com-
mon law indemnity claims. In Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E.
439 (1903), the Court of Appeals approved the fiction of an implied contract of indemnity in
order to permit a tortfeasor whose negligence was "passive" to recover from an "active" joint
tortfeasor. In adopting the quasi-contract approach, the Court noted the distinction between
indemnity protecting against liability and indemnity protecting only against loss. The former
requires the indemnitor to respond as soon as a liability is incurred, while the latter creates
no obligation to indemnify until actual loss is suffered. 175 N.Y. at 218, 67 N.E. at 440; see
Brown v. Mechanics & Traders' Bank, 43 App. Div. 173, 59 N.Y.S. 354 (1st Dep't 1899). The
Dunn Court concluded that an implied contract of indemnity is analogous to an express
indemnity contract for "loss or damage." 175 N.Y. at 218, 67 N.E. at 440. Other courts,
extrapolating from this reasoning, concluded that a cause of action for indemnity accrued
only upon payment of the awarded damages. See Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 254
N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964); Satta v. City of New York, 272 App. Div. 782, 70 N.Y.S.2d
575 (2d Dep't 1947).
The availability of certain pre-judgment procedural devices for asserting Dole claims,
however, seems inconsistent with this "traditional analysis." Despite the apparent contradic-
tion, the courts generally have taken a pragmatic position, allowing assertion of claims for
contribution prior to the theoretical date of accrual, in the interest of consolidating actions
and promoting judicial economy. See Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls Royce of England,
Ltd., 47 Misc. 2d 771, 263 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). See generally Contribu-
tion, supra, at 230.
2 See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. State, 83 Misc. 2d 426, 371 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Winn
v. Peter Bratti Asss., 80 Misc. 2d 756, 364 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1975);
Zillman v. Meadowbrook Hosp. Co., 73 Misc. 2d 726, 342 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 45 App. Div. 2d 267, 358 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1974).
In adopting the date-of-judgment approach, the O'Sullivan court was persuaded by the
language of CPLR 5011, which provides that "[a] judgment is the determination of the rights
of the parties in an action." CPLR 5011; 83 Misc. 2d at 433, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 774. Reasoning
that the obligation to pay damages does not arise until a judgment is entered, the court
rejected argument that the rendition of a verdict should mark the accrual of a Dole claim.
Id. at 434, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 774 (citing CPLR 5011). The O'Sullivan court also pointed out
that the date-of-judgment rule is preferable to the date-of-payment rule because it results in
less delay and therefore is less prejudicial to the party from whom contribution is sought. 83
Misc. 2d at 438-39, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
11 See, e.g., Bay Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State, 84 Misc. 2d 801, 376 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Ct.
Cl. 1975), modified, 57 App. Div. 2d 237, 394 N.Y.S.2d 464 (3d Dep't 1977), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d
49, 375 N.E.2d 29, 404 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1978); Leibowitz v. State, 82 Misc. 2d 424, 371 N.Y.S.2d
110 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
"4 44 N.Y.2d 49, 375 N.E.2d 29, 404 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1978), aff'g 57 App. Div. 2d 237, 394
N.Y.S.2d 464 (3d Dep't 1977), modifying 84 Misc. 2d 801, 376 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
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holding that a Dole claim accrues when the judgment is paid by
the party seeking contribution."
The claimant in Bay Ridge was sued in federal court for the
allegedly negligent hiring of a building custodian who had killed one
of the building's tenants. 8 The custodian had been released from a
state psychiatric facility shortly before the incident. Seeking con-
tribution from the state in the federal action, Bay Ridge filed a
third-party impleader complaint, which ultimately was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.9 Following the dismissal, almost 3 years
after the killing, Bay Ridge instituted a separate action in the New
York Court of Claims by serving the state attorney general with both
a notice of intention to file a claim and a proposed claim for indem-
nity and apportionment from the State."'e Holding that claimant's
Dole cause of action accrued on the date of the killing, the Court of
Claims dismissed the action for failure to comply with the filing
requirements of the Court of Claims Act. °10 The Appellate Division,
44 N.Y.2d at 53, 375 N.E.2d at 30, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
Id. The killing occurred on July 2, 1972, and the victim's estate commenced a wrongful
death action against Bay Ridge, the building owner, on April 1, 1974.
"Id.
11 Id. In its impleader complaint, Bay Ridge alleged that the custodian was released
prematurely from the state facility. Before serving its complaint, Bay Ridge notified the state
of its plan to assert a claim for contribution should a judgment be entered against it. Id.
"The eleventh amendment has been held to immunize the states from suits brought in
the federal courts by their own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,21 (1890); see Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). Presumably, it was on this basis that the federal
district court dismissed Bay Ridge's impleader complaint.
110 44 N.Y.2d at 53, 375 N.E.2d at 30, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 74. Notice of intention to file a
claim and the proposed claim were served on June 3, 1975, approximately 3 years after the
killing and 2 months after the dismissal of claimant's impleader complaint. Id.
"I1 Id. In granting the state's motion to dismiss, the Court of Claims held that the 6-
month filing limitation in § 10(4) of the Court of Claims Act was applicable. Bay Ridge Air
Rights, Inc. v. State, 84 Misc. 2d 801, 803 n., 376 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 n. (Ct. Cl. 1975). See
N.Y. CT. CL. Act § 10(4) (McKinney 1963). Section 10(4), which governs contract actions
against the state, generally has been applied in actions for contribution. The courts have
reasoned that, because a Dole claim is essentially one for partial or full indemnity derived
from an implied-in-law contract, see note 91 supra, the contract limitations period of § 10(4)
controls. See, e.g., Bay Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State, 57 App. Div. 2d 237,238,394 N.Y.S.2d
464, 465 (3d Dep't 1977), affl'd, 44 N.Y.2d 49, 375 N.E.2d 29, 404 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1978); Gates-
Chili Cent. School Dist. v. State, 55 App. Div. 2d 44, 46, 389 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (4th Dep't
1976); Berlin & Jones, Inc. v. State, 85 Misc. 2d 970,973, 381 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Leibowitz v. State, 82 Misc. 2d 424, 429, 371 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (Ct. Cl. 1975); cf. O'Sullivan
v. State, 83 Misc. 2d 426, 371 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Ct. Cl. 1975), discussed in The Survey, 50 ST.
JoHN's L. Rav. 771, 801 (1976) (Dole claim is within "catch all" provision of subdivision 4).
Similarly, CPLR 213(2), which provides that an action upon a contract shall be commenced
within 6 years of accrual, has been held to govern Dole claims which are asserted in a separate
action. See, e.g., Blum v. Good Humor Corp., 57 App. Div. 2d 911, 911, 394 N.Y.S.2d 894,
896 (2d Dep't 1977). Pre-Dole decisions also construed actions for indemnification or contri-
bution as quasi-contractual in nature and therefore governed by the period of limitations for
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Third Department, affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the
suit was premature since judgment had neither been entered nor
paid. 02
On appeal, a unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that a Dole claim does not accrue until payment of the judgment
by the claimant.103 Chief Judge Breitel, writing for the Court, ob-
served that, while common law claims for indemnity classically
were deemed to accrue on the date the claimant discharged his
liability to the injured party, disagreement persisted as to when
Dole contribution claims ripen."' While acknowledging that the
"evil attendant upon a delayed accrual date [is] substantial, "1
the Court nonetheless was unable to discern anything in either Dole
or article 14 to justify disparate treatment of Dole claims for appor-
tionment and traditional claims for indemnity.1 6 Absent legislative
authorization, the Court concluded, 1w it was not empowered "to cut
contract actions. See, e.g., Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't
1964); Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls Royce of England, Ltd., 47 Misc. 2d 771, 773, 263
N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); Hansen v. City of New York, 43 Misc. 2d
1048, 252 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964).
112 57 App. Div. 2d at 240, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 466. Bay Ridge's claim was dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of a new claim should one accrue. Id.
'3 44 N.Y.2d at 53, 375 N.E.2d at 30, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
Id. at 53-54, 375 N.E.2d at 31, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 75; see notes 91-93 supra.
's Id. at 55, 375 N.E.2d at 31, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 75. While the date-of-payment accrual
rule generally placed the impleaded defendant at a significant disadvantage, the Bay Ridge
Court observed that "[i]n this particular case, the State [was] not hopelessly disadvan-
taged," because the claimant had notified the state attorney general of its intention to seek
apportionment in December 1974. The claiman's unsuccessful attempt to implead the state
in the underlying federal action also served to give notice of potential liability. Id., 375 N.E.2d
at 32, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
"I Id., 375 N.E.2d at 31, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 75. The Court rejected, without explanation,
the state's contention that the contribution claim accrued upon commencement of the under-
lying tort action. It also declined to adopt a date-of-injury rule, observing that, under this
approach, the injured party's failure to commence a tort action within the short Court of
Claims limitations period, see note 101 supra, could foreclose any claim the defendant might
have for contribution from'the state. 44 N.Y.2d at 53, 375 N.E.2d at 31, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
Moreover, in the Court's view, the date-of-injury rule, which would deem the apportionment
claim to accrue before entry or payment of judgment, is inconsistent with "traditional concep-
tual analysis of accruals of causes of action [for indemnity]." Id. at 55, 375 N.E.2d at 31,
404 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
"7 44 N.Y.2d at 55-56, 375 N.E.2d at 31-32, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 75-76. In deferring to the
legislature, the Bay Ridge Court joined numerous other courts that have suggested a legisla-
tive solution to the question of when a Dole claim accrues. See Berlin & Jones, Inc. v. State,
85 Misc. 2d 970, 977, 381 N.Y.S.2d 778, 783 (Ct. Cl. 1976); O'Sullivan v. State, 83 Misc. 2d
426, 437, 371 N.Y.S.2d 766, 777 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Leibowitz v. State, 82 Misc. 2d 424, 429, 371
N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (Ct. Cl. 1975). With respect to claims for contribution against the state,
the Bay Ridge Court offered two alternative approaches to resolving the accrual imbroglio.
It suggested that an earlier accrual date could be established by statute. The Court was more
supportive, however, of legislation which would authorize the claimant to implead the state
in the underlying action. 44 N.Y.2d at 56, 375 N.E.2d at 32, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 76.0
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off abruptly a cause of action good until then under conventional
law."08
While the Bay Ridge Court's resolution of the date of accrual
controversy comports with longstanding precedent,'09 it is submitted
that the Court's uncritical adherence to this authority is ill-advised
in view of.the policies underlying the statutory changes in third-
party practice prompted by the Dole decision. Article 14 was in-
tended, in part, to encourage trial of multi-party tort litigation in a
single action."10 The Bay Ridge decision, which-sanctions mainte-
nance of separate Dole claims years after the original tortious act,"'
is clearly not supportive of that aim. Moreover, it is difficult to
reconcile the Court's continued endorsement of the date-of-
payment accrual, which is based upon the concept of indemnity
against loss," 2 with the Dole Court's holding that liability, not loss,
is to be apportioned among tortfeasors."13 Since indemnity princi-
Ios 44 N.Y.2d at 55, 375 N.E.2d at 31, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 76. Since Bay Ridge's Dole
apportionment claim had not yet accrued, the Court did not reach the issue of which Court
of Claims Act limitations period would have been applicable. Id. at 56, 375 N.E.2d at 32, 404
N.Y.S.2d at 76. See also note 101 supra.
'' See note 91 supra.
,, See Addiego v. Interboro Gen. Hosp., 81 Misc. 2d 96, 365 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1975); Meckley v. Hertz Corp., 88 Misc. 2d 605, 388 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1976). See also TwENTmr ANN. REIP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 221 (1975).
"I In O'Sullivan v. State, 83 Misc. 2d 426, 371 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Ct. Cl. 1975), the court
observed that adherence to the date-of-payment rule and the attendant possibilities of
"motions addressed to judgments, appeals and cross appeals therefrom . . . would result in
• . .delay. . . so overbearing in prejudice that it can neither be countenanced nor permit-
ted." Id. at 438-39, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 778. The practical effect of such delay may be to give
considerable tactical advantage to a third-party plaintiff who delays bringing a separate
action for contribution until after witnesses disappear or memories dim and a reasonable
opportunity to ascertain the facts surrounding the claim has passed. In fact, the jurisdictional
filing requirements of the Court of Claims Act are designed to avoid such delays and to give
the state an opportunity to promptly and thoroughly investigate claims. See Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co. v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 454, 363 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Ct. Cl. 1975), aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d
356, 378 N.Y.S.2d 95 (3d Dep't 1976), aff'd mem., 41 N.Y.2d 884, 362 N.E.2d 624, 393
N.Y.S.2d 994 (1977); Wasserberger v. State, 6 Misc. 2d 678, 164 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
See also Williams v. State, 77 Misc. 2d 396, 353 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Gonzales v.
State, 69 Misc. 2d 432, 330 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Ct. Cl. 1972). The consequences of delay cannot
be minimized in view of the magnitude of annual awards in the Court of Claims. See [1976]
N.Y. Dep't R. 49 ($19,674,296.73); [1975] N.Y. Dep't R. 48 ($38,397,002.22). In view of the
Bay Ridge decision, however, it appears that the only remedy a third-party defendant would
have where assertion of the Dole claim has been inordinately delayed is the interposition of
a laches defense. Recently, such a defense was recognized in Blum v. Good Humor Corp., 57
App. Div. 2d 911, 911-12, 394 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896 (2d Dep't 1977), where a separate action for
apportionment was commenced many years after the original tortious act and 13 months after
payment of the judgment awarded in the underlying action. But see Musco v. Conte, 22 App.
Div. 2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964).
112 See note 107 supra.
"3 See note 91 supra.
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ples underlying the date-of-payment rule are actually nothing more
than judicially created fictions,"' the Bay Ridge Court's deference
to the legislature115 and concomitant reluctance to repudiate this
rule are difficult to justify.1
Thomas M. Dawson
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
Representation by layman held not to deprive accused of right to
counsel
The right to counsel embodied in the sixth amendment' has
been interpreted to include the right to effective representation by
counsel at trial."" While it is clear that incompetent advocacy by a
14 See note 91 supra.
' 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
"' Professor Occhialino's recognition of the conflict between post-Dole third-party prac-
tice principles and a date-of-payment accrual led him to propose that Dole claims be deemed
to accrue when the defendant in the underlying action is served with process. Contribution,
supra note 91, at 231. This proposal has several practical advantages. For example, all claims
arising from a single incident would more likely be tried in one proceeding, thereby minimiz-
ing the impact on already crowded dockets and simplifying the apportionment of fault among
the parties. Id. Where the claimant seeks contribution from the state, of course, adoption of
a date-of-service rule would alleviate much of the prejudice to the state resulting from adher-
ence to date-of-payment accrual. See note 111 supra. Moreover, the tortfeasor served with
process would not be placed at a disadvantage, since he will generally be aware at the time
of service of any contribution rights he might have against joint tortfeasors. Contribution,
supra note 91, at 231. Professor Occhialino also suggested a specific 1-year limitation period
for Dole claims, but acknowledged the "element of arbitrariness" inherent in the choice of
time period. Id. at 233.
.. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. As early as 1932, the Supreme Court characterized represen-
tation by counsel in capital cases as "vital and imperative." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932). In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), however, the Court stated flatly that
"appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial" in all criminal
cases. Id. at 471. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) the Court expressly
overruled Betts, holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel was applicable to state
felony proceedings through the fourteenth amendment. Thereafter, the Court extended the
right to counsel to all criminal prosecutions involving a potential deprivation of liberty. See
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). For a critical analysis of the results of these
decisions, see Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811 (1976).
"I McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85, 90 (1955); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); see People v. LaBree, 34 N.Y.2d
257, 313 N.E.2d 730, 357 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1974); People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 280
N.E.2d 637, 639, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1972). The Supreme Court has declined to establish
specific standards for determining whether "effective representation" has been provided. See
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). In New York, the courts have utilized the
"mockery of justice" test articulated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). Under
this test, the defendant has the burden of showing that his attorney made glaring errors that
